A couple of things to add to the last post. Firstly the Swedes had abandoned the arquebus before the start of the Thirty Year's War so all infantry units are musket armed. Secondly in each brigade the squadron with the most pikemen is assumed to have formed the point of the arrowhead or diamond. Personally I'm finding it difficult to accept that some brigades had no pikemen at all but in the absence of evidence I will go with that interpretation until a better one comes along.
So, after looking at the Infantry I can turn to what seems (in theory at least) the easier part of the army!
Cavalry
Native Swedish cavalry had two major disadvantages in the years prior to the Thirty Year's War. Firstly their horses were neither large enough nor strong enough to carry a heavily armoured trooper as effectively as their enemies. Secondly they struggled to manufacture sufficient wheellock pistols and armour to create troops capable of acting as armoured cuirassiers. This is not to say that he did not have small numbers of Swedish cuirassiers available but these were mainly bodyguard units. Gustavus' solution to this shortage was to use his other cavalry more aggressively, in a similar way to the French Huguenot Miller cavalry. He took away the carbines from his Harquebusier style troops and left them with swords and pistols, and placed those troopers with armour in the front ranks. To offset the lack of mounted close fire support for the charging cavalry he deployed bodies of musketeers between each squadron of horse in the front lines. This would have been effective against an enemy who wanted to use Harquebusiers to soften up the Swedish cavalry prior to a Cuirassier charge but was risky against an enemy who closed to melee quickly unless the Swedish cavalry could hold them off! Apparently at Breitenfeld Tilly was taken by surprise by the aggressive Swedish tactics as he had never considered Harquebusier style horse as 'Battle Cavalry'.
Gustavus Adolfus at Breitenfeld 1632 with cavalry in background by Johann Jakob Walther |
By the 1630's to support the more lightly armoured Swedish cavalry, heavier cuirassier and better equipped harquebusier style cavalry were provided by German mercenaries or allies.
I would treat the native Swedish/Finnish horse as shock or mixed shock with an option to class some as poorly equipped horse to reflect the lower proportion of troops with back and breast plates. I would also treat the Finnish 'Hakkapeliitta' Horse as elite to reflect their reputation. They are classed as trained and experienced or veteran from Sweden's entry into the Thirty Years War reducing to trained and experienced after Lutzen.
Native Swedish/Finnish horse probably deployed in three ranks to fight but probably manoeuvred in six ranks. Cuirassiers should be deployed in deeper formations of at least six ranks if they are firepower or mixed firepower tactic troops or three ranks if mixed shock. They are classed as armoured. Swedish allied cavalry might be considered as unwilling if representing Saxons at Breitenfeld, and should be considered as trained but raw for that battle other wise treat as trained and experienced or veteran if long serving German mercenaries.
Formation sizes are harder to be precise about but seem to have been in the range of 200 - 400 men per battlefield Squadron. The table below gives some formation data drawn from Daniel S's blog post: The Swedish Army in the Battle of Breitenfeld 1631 | Kriegsbuch. The whole site is a mine of information as are his posts on The Miniatures Page (TMP).
Swedish cavalry at 1st Breitenfeld |
The table above covers all Swedish, and mercenary cavalry but excludes the Saxon allied horse. The column titled "Harq'bus'" covers all non 3/4 armoured cuirassier type cavalry, these are both the traditional Harquebusiers and the more lightly armed Swedes and Finns. The data for Cuirassiers covers all formations that are known to have been or may have been 3/4 armoured. Based upon this roughly 35% of the cavalry were Cuirassiers and these tended to be in larger formations than their less well equipped brethren. There were also between 400-500 Dragoons present which are not included in the table.
Swedish cavalry at Lutzen 1632 |
I'm saying 'may' as my available sources don't show a split between harquebusier and cuirassier style cavalry. Because of that I have made the following assumptions. Those squadrons thought to have been cuirassier equipped at Breitenfeld are still equipped that way at Lutzen the following year. That none of the new units are cuirassiers, except Ohme who formed the central cavalry reserve. It would seem sensible to have that reserve made up of the heaviest available cavalry so Cuirassiers seemed to fit the bill. Please note that I have excluded the Saxon and Hessian horse from the above table, as I'm trying to concentrate on the Swedes and mercenaries in their service here. For completeness be aware that the Saxon and Hessian allies provided three additional squadrons of cavalry at Lutzen.
Cavalry may have company sized bodies of 50 or 100 shot attached and after 1631 a single ultra light gun may be deployed with each body of commanded shot as detailed in the rules on sub-units. These bodies deployed in the spaces between front line cavalry squadrons.
Dragoons
I have struggled to find much information on dragoons in the Swedish army. The order of battle for 1st Breitenfeld shows 400-500 dragoons were present. None of my available sources gives any information for them being present at other battles but I find it hard to believe that they vanished after Breitenfeld. I suggest that unless an OOB clearly states no dragoons were present that you should have a single squadron of no more than 500 dragoons present. At Breitenfeld they were used to provide fire support to the cavalry on the left of the Swedish army so it is possible that at least some of the shot detachments supporting the cavalry wings in later actions were dismounted dragoons.
Artillery
Like the Dutch the Swedes supported their infantry with artillery at the brigade level. However, forget the myth of leather guns, which if they ever saw use at all were probably not used for very long and not in Germany. Instead use 3pdr ultra-light guns as infantry support (if you want to think of them as made of leather that's fine by me). Each Brigade would have at least one supporting gun per squadron of foot and ideally would have two or even three. These guns were not automatically deployed with their parent brigade, as at First Breitenfeld some seem to have been deployed from the second line brigades to boost the support for those brigades in the front line. At second Breitenfeld (1642) the 3pdrs were allocated in a large part to the cavalry wings at a ratio of one gun per division of commanded shot leaving only 11 to support the infantry centre of 8 brigades.
Swedish 3pdr; the paint scheme may be a later addition |
The heavier field artillery seem to have been mainly 24pdrs and 18pdrs. The Swedish had a liking for massing the heavy artillery in batteries to the front of the Infantry centre, these batteries could be extremely large. For example at the crossing of the River Lech in 1632 the 72 available guns were all massed into three batteries of 24 guns each (including the 3pdrs)! In the battles where I could easily find data the heavier guns never exceeded 34% of the total guns deployed. The table below gives numbers of guns and their percentage of the total artillery deployed and the average number of 3pdrs for each brigade present. As noted that doesn't mean these deployed with their parent brigade/regiment.
Some examples of the split in artillery allocations by shot weight |
The data for Lutzen shown above is an estimate as the Swedish records simply state 70 guns were present of which 20 were heavy guns but doesn't detail their size. A minimum of three 24pdrs were present as a salvo from three of these opened the Swedish assault.
In every TYW battle I can find details of the Swedes deployed more artillery than their opponents, be those Imperials, Catholic League or Spanish. Well over half the total number of guns available in the army were infantry support ultra light pieces as shown above.
Army Deployment
Infantry commonly deployed in two lines of brigades to provide support and (as at Breitenfeld) create a reserve that could be deployed to cover a turned flank or replace a frontline brigade. I would use the three squadron Brigade between 1627 and 1631 and the four squadron brigade between 1631 and 1632 (Lutzen seems to have been the last use of four squadron brigades) then revert to three squadron brigades until some point prior to Nordlingen. From Nordlingen and later the size of the individual infantry squadrons and their deployment pattern shifted to a simpler model as described in the previous post on the Swedes.
A cavalry reserve would be deployed to support the infantry centre although the bulk of the horse were deployed to the two wings of the army. This could be as small as one squadron, as at Lutzen or two or three squadrons supporting each line of infantry brigades as at Breitenfeld.
Regarding the Swedish dragoons. In 1620s, during the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Swedes really struggle with deploying them, having only few companies. For example in summer 1626, when Gustav Adolf’s army landed in Prussia, it only had one company of 77 men, reaching three companies (each 150 men) in 1627 + two companies of the unknown size in Livonia. In 1629 only two companies took part in campaign in Prussia, so nothing serious. Larger recruitment started from 1630, with plans to build up army for campaign in Germany. Known regiments from the early stage of the Swedish phase of TYW:
ReplyDelete- Lars Kagg’s regiment– recruited in summer 1630, with 8 companies (total of 1200 men), took heavy losses in 1632 and by November 1632 had only 200 men in 8 companies
- Georg Kristofer von Taupadel’s squadron/regiment – made up of four (or six) independent dragoon companies in spring 1630, on December 1630 5 companies with 636 men, with further 500 dragoons sent to Germany in February 1631: so at some point probably he had ‘old’ squadron and ‘new’ regiment, that due to losses were merged into one unit in late 1631
- Daniel de Bataille du Meny’s regiment – from spring 1631(?), in November 1632 8 companies with total of 350 men
- Erik Hansson Ulfsparre’s squadron – in November 1632 6 companies with total of 600 men
- Jorgen Kristoffer von Rosen’s regiment – planned in autumn 1631 as regiment of 12 companies with total of 1800 men. In December 1631 12 companies with 1070 men in service. Took heavy losses in March 1632 and was temporary merged with depleted Kagg’s regiments. From November 1632 again as independent unit, under Wolf Henrik von Baudissin, 7 companies with total of 455 men
- In 1631-1632 there were also few independent dragoon companies recruited in Germany, not serving as a part of the regiments mentioned above.
Thanks for stopping by Kadrinazi this is really useful information. Do you know what war service these units saw? Were they used on the battlefield or more in scouting and capturing points like bridges ahead of the main army?
DeleteBecause Swedish army lacked light cavalry, dragoons had to do all boring yet vital works that you mentioned, like scouting, capturing bridges, fords, etc. As there was always not enough dragoons, they were spread rather thinly, especially in 1630-1633, when Swedish army was divided into few field armies.That's why you normally can't see them during larger pitched battles, as they were busy elsewhere. I don't think there was a single unit of them at Wittstock in 1636 or Leipzig (second battle of Breitenfeld) in 1642, while at the battle of Jankau/Jankow in 1645 they were left to guard the baggage train.
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