My post covering a possible rule to cover the risk of a unit running low and subsequently then running out of ammunition sparked a healthy debate on the TMP boards. Much more than I expected. The responses split into two groups. Those who felt that unit commanders should know what the ammo supply state was and control the engagement accordingly and those who felt that at some point going up the chain of command that ability to read the minutiae of a battle was lost. It was partly split on time periods too with those who game in mechanised periods less keen on the suggested rule as they considered that commanders should never be surprised by running out of ammo.
The debate focussed on the view that where an army has a firm understanding of it's supply position pre battle then the risk of going ammunition depleted should or could be managed and reflected in the way the battle is fought. There was also a feeling that resupply was so well organised that using up ammunition should be an extreme case. One responder seemed to think that a very detailed rule would be required and that the overhead wasn't worth while. He even wondered about the available statistical evidence and how well my rule reflected those details. My problem is that while I can give statistics on the rate of use of ammunition for the British Civil Wars based on re-enacting experience and that I do know that resupply of filled bandoliers was carried out in some cases, the rest of the data isn't (or at least isn't easily) available. So I can't point to a battle where ammunition ran out or had to be resupplied but can find evidence where the move to close combat happened because powder and shot was in short supply.
The one thing I can be sure about is that a musketeer's initial load of powder and shot was commonly between 14 - 18 premeasured shots and that an initial rate of fire of two shots a minute was easily attainable although as muskets fouled this would slow down due to the difficulty of ramming home the musket ball. Even with slower firing either from firing by single ranks or files or due to fouled muskets one shot a minute should be achievable. At those rates it is entirely possible for a block of musketeers to use all of the powder and shot they carried on their persons in around 30 minutes (or three turns in my rules). For an army to keep a steady rate of fire up either units had to be rotated to the front or powder and shot resupplied. Even with the typically short time in action during BCW fights I think it is it is a constraint worth modelling.
Under the proposed rule the chance of a unit becoming low on ammo is 15/216 or just over 2% . Subsequently the chance of running out is also 15/216 so pretty long odds of going out of ammunition before resupply is arranged. For steady fire (introduction, extraduction and the like) I upped the requirement to rolling 3 sixes on the 3D6 firing roll to drop to low and then out of ammo status, which is 1/216 or under 0.5%. So if a unit is low on ammo they can change firing tactics to conserve powder. That works for me.
While I do like to stay close to statistical norms for my rules where the data isn't available the best I can do is create a rule to require decisions to be made about things where the real commanders had to make those decisions. In this case about resource allocation and rate of use. The key point being that we are dealing with human issues such as how fast is a unit burning through it's powder as well as some abstract ones such as quality of gun powder. For example, what if going out of ammo replicates successful resupply from local resources but the resupply powder is damp or adulterated or unavailable so a unit which expected to be able to continue a fire fight cannot do so? (Isandlwana anyone?)
I reread the original post and came to the conclusion that my suggested rule works best for pre mechanised armies where the player is sitting at army commander level rather than at battalia or brigade level. Once we get to periods where logistics are being well managed and rates of depletion of ammunition are known, then I'm happy to accept that those armies can be assumed to be dealing with the problem without player input. For lower level combats at platoon level or lower then maybe some rule is needed as I recall that one of the main tasks of an infantryman was to manage their ammunition and it was rare to use rapid fire for a sustained period. I'd want to cover that in a different way.
I think it’s entire reasonable to model running out of ammunition. As you say, 18 rounds isn’t very much. In the SYW infantry carried anything from 50-70 rounds, and at Leuthen Frederick still ensured there were wagons on hand to deliver as much again, yet some units still ran out of ammo. Even more recent wars you hear of troops having to give up the fight for lack of ammo. Is it a surprise to the commander? Maybe, maybe not. Can he do anything about it is the key question. I don’t imagine the likes of Byron went around his battalia during the battle to supervise supplies. At best he would have known before the battle they were short of ammo.
ReplyDeleteThe only alternative I’d suggest is give each foot unit three turns of fire then they’re out of ammo.
Chris/Nundanket